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THE AUTHORITY OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYER
TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
IN THE ABSENCE OF A STATE STATUTE:
OHIO, A CASE IN POINT
ON JULY 5, 1935, m CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES enacted the
original National Labor Relations Act.' Through this Act Congress
sought to encourage collective bargaining and protect the workers' "full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representa-
tives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection." 2
The Act created a duty to bargain on the part of the employer though
it excluded from the term employer "any State or political subdivision
thereof .... .4 Thus, this statute created no duty on the part of the
public employer to bargain collectively with its employees though many
states subsequently enacted legislation which either required or permitted
the public employer to "meet and confer" or to bargain collectively
with its employees. 5 In contrast, it was generally held that in those states
29 U.S.C. § 151-168 (1970).
2 Id. § 151.
3 Id. § 158(a)(5).
4 Id. § 152(2).
5 At least twenty-five states have enacted reasonably comprehensive legislation; at
least fifteen states have separate statutes granting teachers the right to collectively
bargain; and at least eight states have laws concering firemen and/or policemen. R.
SMITH, H. EDWARDS, & R. CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 332-33
(1974) [hereinafter cited as SMITH].
Comprehensive: ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.40.070 -.260 (1972); CAL. GOV'T CODE 9
3500 -09 (West 1966), as amended, (West Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-467
to -479 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1301-12 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 447.201-
.607 (Cum. Supp. 1975-76); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 89-1 to -20 (Supp. 1974); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4321 to -4337 (Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 979 to
979-0 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1975-76); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150 E, §§ 1-15
(Supp. 1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 43.201 -.216 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
179.61 -.77 (Supp. 1975-76); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 105.500 -.530 (Vernon 1966), as amended,
(Vernon, Cum. Supp. 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §9 59-1601 to -1616 (Supp. 1974);
NEB. REV. STAT. 9 48-837 (1970); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 288:140 - :220 (1975); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 273-A:1 to -A:16 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAW §§ 200 - 204a
(McKinney 1973), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975-76); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 548.4 (Supp. 1975-76); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 243.650 -. 782 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, §§ 1101.101 -. 2301 (Supp. 1975-76); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.4-1 to -9.4-19
(1969); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 3-18-1 to 3-18-17 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§§ 1721 -35 (Cum. Supp. 1975-76); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41.56.010 to 41.56.950
(1972), as amended, (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70 -.77, .80 -.97 (1974).
Teachers: ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.560 (1975); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13080 -13090
(West 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-153a to -153h (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 14, §§ 4001 -13 (1975); IDAHO CODE §§ 33-1271 to -1276 (Supp. 1975); IND. CODE§§ 20-7.5-1-1 to 20-7.5-1-14 (Burns 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5413 to -5425 (1972);
MD. ANN. CODE tit. 77, § 160 (1975); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 75-6115 to -6128
(1971); NEB. REV. STAT. 99 79-1287 to -1295 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15-38.1-01
to -15 (1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 509.1-.10 (1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§
28-9.3-1 to -9.3-16 (1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1981-2010 (Cum. Supp. 1975);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 28A.72.010-.090 (1970).
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without such statutes the public employer had no duty or even any right
or power to bargain collectively with its employees.
6
Ohio is one such state in which there is no statute explicitly enabling
a public employer to engage in collective bargaining, and until recently
the courts have usually invalidated any such agreement. Despite the
non-legal status of these agreements, public employers have with in-
creasing frequency been engaging in collective negotiations and entering
into the resultant "contract." Thus, an anomalous situation has been
created wherein the public employer and the union representing the pub-
lic employees engage in bargaining though the union is aware that the
employer is not bound to carry through the terms of the agreement.
The rationales which the courts in Ohio have used to invalidate public
employer collective bargaining agreements reflect the arguments tradi-
tionally used in other jurisdictions. Since these rationales are no longer
in congruence with the realities of labor relations in the public sector,
they need to be reexamined so that a firm legal basis can be created
for participation by all public employers in collective negotiations. The
courts in Ohio have been considering the issue with increasing fre-
quency,7 and recently the Ohio Supreme Court in Dayton Classroom
Teachers Association v. Dayton Board of Education" reached the deci-
sion that school boards do have the authority to enter collective bargain-
Firemen and/or Policemen: ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 450 (3) (Cum. Supp. 1973); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 54-1301 to -1315 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 345.010 -.130 (1973)
(only cities containing a population of at least 300,000 or any city that petitions the
Commissioner of Labor); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1 -. 10 (Supp. 1975-76); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.1-2 to 28-9.1-14 (1969); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 9-14A-
1 to -22 (Supp. 1975); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 5154c-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975-76); Wvo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 27-265 to -273 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
6 International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 321 v. Water Works Bd., 276 Ala. 462,
163 So. 2d 619 (1964); Dade County v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 157
So. 2d 176 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963); Miami Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157
Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946); International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Georgia Ports
Authority, 217 Ga. 712, 124 S.E.2d 733 (1962); Wichita Public School Employees Local
512 v. Smith, 194 Kan. 2, 397 P.2d 357 (1964); Mugford v. Mayor & City Council, 185
Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945); Weakley County Municipal Elec. Sys. v. Vick, 43 Tenn.
App. 524, 309 S.W.2d 792 (1957); City of Alcoa v. Electrical Workers Local 760, 203
Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476 (1957).
7 From 1945 to 1968 only two published cases were decided which dealt with public sec-
tor collective bargaining. Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d
246 (1947); City of Cleveland v. Street Employees Div. 268, 30 Ohio Op. 395 (C.P.
1945).
Since 1969 at least eight decisions have dealt with the issue. They are: Dayton
Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d
714 (1975); Malone v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 33362 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9,
1975); North Royalton Educ. Ass'n v. North Royalton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio App. 2d
209, 325 N.E.2d 901 (1974); Hamilton Bd. of Educ. v. Arthur, 84 L.R.R.M. 2468 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1973); Youngstown Educ. Ass'n v. Youngstown City Bd. of Educ., 136 Ohio
App. 2d 35, 301 N.E.2d 891 (1973); Foltz v. City of Dayton, 27 Ohio App. 2d 35, 272
N.E.2d 169 (1970); Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. Division 11 of the Ohio
Dep't of Highways, 28 Ohio Misc. 153, 272 N.E.2d 919 (C.P. 1970); Cincinnati Metro-
politan Housing Authority v. Cincinnati Dist. Council No. 51, 17 Ohio Misc. 134, 244
N.E.2d 898, rev'd on other grounds, 22 Ohio App. 2d 39, 257 N.E.2d 410 (C.P. 1969).
1 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975).
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ing agreements.9 The decision of the court, however, seems superficial
and incomplete, leaving many questions in the area unanswered.
This comment will discuss the traditional arguments against collec-
tive bargaining, suggest answers to those arguments, and analyze the
Dayton Classroom Teachers Association decision. It will conclude with
an analysis of how the issues should be considered and suggest the prob-
lems which are presented by Ohio's case law.
I. THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN
Pueu~c EMPLOYER COLLECrIVE BARGAINING
The arguments which Ohio courts have used to invalidate public em-
ployer collective bargaining agreements include the initial proposition
that labor relations statutes do not apply to public employers and public
employees, and the more basic arguments that local governmental pow-
ers are narrowly construed, that such an agreement would be contrary to
the purpose of civil service laws, and that a local governmental body can-
not delegate its authority. There is also the argument that a public em-
ployer cannot bind its successors and though this argument has not been
used to invalidate any public employer agreements which will be specif-
ically discussed in this comment, it has nevertheless been rebutted in a
recent Ohio case.' 0 Some courts have likewise rejected the proposition
that a proprietary-governmental dichotomy would be relevant to the labor
relations sphere."
In addition to the collective bargaining issue there are the sub-issues
of exclusive representation, union security, and arbitration. The argu-
ments against allowing collective bargaining in the public sector are
equally applicable to these sub-issues. Thus, there is no scarcity of issues
or arguments though their application leaves much to be desired.
A. Statutory Use of "Employer" and "Employee"
The initial point of analysis in several cases has revolved around the
question of whether the statutory use of the words "employer" and
"employee" include the public employer and public employee. 2  In
Ohio, as in several other jurisdictions, 3 the courts have determined that
a public employer and a public employee cannot be included by implica-
tion when only the terms "employer" and "employee" are used in the
9 Id. at 132, 323 N.E.2d at 717.
10 North Royalton Educ. Ass'n v, North Royalton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio App. 2d 209, 325
N.E.2d 901 (1974). See text accompanying notes 70-72 infra.
" See cases cited note 73 infra.
t See generally Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947);
City of Cleveland v. Street Employees Div. 268, 30 Ohio Op. 395 (C.P. 1945).
13 See Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946); Miami
Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Robison, 91 Idaho 445, 423 P.2d 999 (1966); Wichita
Public School Employees Local 512 v. Smith, 194 Kan. 2, 397 P.2d 357 (1964); City of
Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
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legislation.' 4 An example of this analysis can be seen in the Ohio Su-
preme Court decision of Hagerman v. City of Dayton15 in which the issue
was whether an ordinance implementing an agreement between the City
of Dayton and the Dayton Public Service Union should be enforced. The
ordinance authorized voluntary deductions (or "check-offs") from the
wages of classified civil service employees which were to be paid to their
union. 16 Such a procedure was thought valid since section 6346-13'
of the Ohio General Code authorized check-off agreements between em-
ployers and unions. The Hagerman court, however, held the check-off
invalid since a municipal corporation "does not come within the meaning
of 'employers' as used in section 6346-13" and "civil service appointees
do not come within the definition of 'employees' as used in such sec-
tion."18
No court in Ohio dealing with the public employer bargaining issue
has specifically rebutted the conclusion of Hagerman regarding the
meaning of the words "employer" and "employee" and it appears that
this interpretation is well grounded in judicial decisions. 19 Thus, given
the case law, it would be very difficult to expand the interpretation of
labor statutes which refer only to "employers" and "employees" to in-
clude public employers and their employees.
B. Authority of Local Government
A second argument against the right of the public employer to en-
gage in collective bargaining is the traditionally narrow reading of the
authority of local governmental bodies. Municipal corporations have
been historically considered creatures of law with their acts being neces-
sarily authorized either by their charters or other laws.2 0 McQuillin, in
Law of Municipal Corporations, describes the powers of a municipal cor-
poration as:
(1) powers expressly conferred by the constitution, statutes or
charter; (2) powers necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident
to, the powers expressly granted; and (3) powers essential to the
declared objects and purposes of the municipality, the latter of-
ten being classified as among the implied powers. This enumer-
ation of powers is exclusive and no other powers exist .... 21
This analysis of the authority of municipal corporations has also been
applied to define school board authority and the more traditional cases
14 Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947); City of Cleveland
v. Street Employees Div. 268, 30 Ohio Op. 395 (C.P. 1945).
15 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947).
16 Id. at 314, 71 N.E.2d at 247.
'7 OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 6346-13 (Page 1945), as amended, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1321.32 (Page 1962).
'a Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 327, 71 N.E.2d 246, 253 (1947).
9 See cases cited note 13 supra.
20 E. MCQUILUN, LAW OF MUNICIPAL Com'oRsAONS § 10.09 (3d ed. 1966).
21 Id.
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narrowly apply the principle and insist upon the need for express au-
thority.22 Some of the more progressive decisions in Ohio, however,
have given a rather flexible interpretation to McQuillin's analysis, espe-
cially parts (2) and (3), and have found the authority of a school board
to collectively bargain "essential to the declared objectives and pur-
poses" of the board.23
The first of the modem decisions which attempted to fit the authorr
ity to engage in collective bargaining within the express or implied
powers of the governing body was Youngstown Education Association v.
Youngstown City Board of Education.24 In that opinion two of the three
presiding judges recognized the argument that there must be a specific
grant of power in some statute or charter before a local government could
enter into a collective bargaining agreement. This authority was found in
section 9.4125 of the Ohio Revised Code which was enacted in response
to the holding of Hagerman. It states:
Notwithstanding section 1321.32 of the Revised Code, the
state of Ohio and any of its political subdivisions or instrumen-
talities may checkoff on the wages of public employees for the
payment of dues to a labor organization of public employees up-
on written authorization by the public employee. Such authori-
zation may be revocable by written notice upon the will of the
employee.
A labor organization or other organization of public employ-
ees receiving such checkoff of dues may be required by the state
of Ohio and any of its political subdivisions or instrumentalities
to defray the actual cost of making such deductions.
26
While section 9.41 may be indicative of the legislature's disapproval
of Hagerman and its recognition and acceptance of the role which unions
are now playing in the public employment sphere, it does not provide
the explicit authority to bargain collectively as the Youngstown Educa-
tion Association opinion declared. This section of the code only gives
the public employer the authority to participate in a voluntary check-off
of dues. Although section 9.41 can be viewed as one step in an argu-
ment that public employers do have the right to bargain collectively be-
cause of its implied sanction of the collective bargaining process, it can-
not be considered an explicit grant of legislative authority.
A better approach to the problem entails a consideration of the stat-
utes which state the purpose for which a governing body was created
and give that body its authority. For example, in the case of school
boards, section 3313.4727 delegates to the board of education the man-
22 See Schwing v. McClure, 120 Ohio St. 335, 166 N.E. 230 (1929); Hamilton Bd. of
Educ. v. Arthur, 84 L.R.R.M. 2468 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
23 See cases cited notes 24 and 30 infra.
24 36 Ohio App. 2d 35, 301 N.E.2d 263 (1973).
25 Ouio REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41 (Page 1968).
20 Id.
27 Id. § 3313.47 (Page 1972).
[Vol. 24:672
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agement and control of all public schools within its district; section
3313.1728 grants the board of education the authority to contract and
be contracted with; and section 3319.0829 grants the board the authority
to enter into written contracts for the employment of teachers. Several
recent decisions have found that these provisions provide an implied
basis for a school board to engage in collective bargaining3 ° and the court
in North Royalton Education Association v. North Royalton Board of
Education3' held that although these sections do not require collec-
tive bargaining they do provide a basis for an implied authority to bargain
collectively. The court noted that there was no indication of a legisla-
tive intent to place the duty upon a school board to negotiate each
employment contract individually and indicated that such a duty would
be too burdensome to be implied.32  The same reasoning that the North
Royalton court used in terms of school boards can be likewise applied
to a local governing body. When such a body has both the power to
enter into employment contracts and the right to establish the working
conditions of its employees it can then be legitimately inferred that the
governing body also has the authority to collectively bargain.
The problem of narrowly construed local authority aside, the con-
struction of the powers of home rule municipal corporations has been
particularly difficult. The Ohio constitution provides for home rule in
section three of article XVIII:
Municipalities shall have the authority to exercise all powers of
local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their lim-
its such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as
are not in conflict with general laws.
As an initial reading might suggest, the language of this provision has
had conflicting analyses. 33 For example, the court in Hagerman broadly
defined police regulations, determined that the check-off in question
28 Id. § 3313.17.
29 Id. § 3319.08.
30 Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323
N.E.2d 774 (1975); Malone v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 33362 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9,
1975); North Royalton Educ. Ass'n v. North Royalton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio App. 2d
209, 325 N.E.2d 901 (1974).
31 41 Ohio App. 2d 209, 325 N.E.2d 901 (1974).
32 Id. at 217, 325 N.E.2d at 907.
33 J. FARRELL, JR., FARRELL-ELLIS OuIO MUNICIPAL CODE § 1.22 (11th ed. 1962). Farrell
finds that the phrase "all powers of local self-goveinment" has been criticized as vague
language. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court in Benjamin v. City of Columbus, 167 Ohio
St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957), indicated that "all powers of self-government" in-
cluded the power to enact all laws necessary for the governing of the municipality, in-
cluding the power to adopt police, sanitary, and other regulations and that the balance
of article XVIII § 3 is merely a limitation on the power of municipalities to adopt police,
sanitary, and other similar regulations. Id. at 108, 146 N.E.2d at 859.
Farrell contends that Benjamin marked a departure from prior analysis. Farrell also
discusses conflict over the term "general laws" stating that there can be no conflict
within the meaning of article XVIII § 3 unless the general law is a police regulation
prescribing a rule of conduct for the entire state. See also Note, Ohio Public Sector
Labor Relations Law: A Time for Reevaluation and Reform, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 679,
689-93 (1973), for a discussion of how home rule problems relate to labor relations in
the public sector.
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came within that description, and consequently found the ordinance in
conflict with the general laws of the state (§ 6346-13 and the civil ser-
vice laws) and thus invalid.34
The determination of Hagerman that a labor relations-type ordinance
is an exercise of police regulatory power has never been explicitly over-
ruled; this conclusion, however, needs to be reconsidered in light of a later
Ohio Supreme Court decision, State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips.35  In
that case the court held that a municipality can establish its own civil
service system in the exercise of its "powers of local self-government"
36
and it further stated that the words "as are not in conflict with general
laws" modify only police regulations and not general local powers. Con-
sequently, provisions of a municipal civil service system dealing with
police promotion which were implemented under powers of local self-
government were valid in spite of the fact that a state statute provided for
different and conflicting regulations.3 7
Inasmuch as both deal with terms and conditions of employment, it
is difficult to determine why a labor relations ordinance is an exercise of a
police regulation while provisions of a civil service system are not. If,
under the reasoning of Canada v. Phillips, labor relations ordinances were
considered exercises of powers of local self-government, then the conflict
clause would not apply. Thus, the municipalities would be able to legis-
late ordinances pursuant to collective bargaining agreements despite
state civil service laws that might conflict. This appears to be one sound
basis on which the narrow interpretation of municipal powers in Hager-
man could be avoided.
C. Potential Conflict with Civil Service Laws
Following the argument of the limited authority of local governmental
bodies, another argument which has been used against the right of the
public employer to engage in collective bargaining is that such a pro-
cedure would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of civil service laws.3 8
Section 1.0 of Article XV of the Ohio constitution provides:
Appointments and promotions in the civil service of the state,
the several counties, and cities, shall be made according to merit
and fitness, to be ascertained, as far as practical, by competi-
tive examinations. Laws shall be passed providing for the en-
forcement of this provision.
The traditional argument is that this section of the constitution and the
laws passed pursuant to it so preempt the area of public labor relations,
34 Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 328, 71 N.E.2d 246, 257 (1947).
3- 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
36 Id. at 191, 151 N.E.2d at 724.
37 Id.
31 Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 328, 71 N.E.2d 246, 253 (1947); see
also Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. Department of Highways Div. 11, 28 Ohio
Misc. 153, 272 N.E.2d 919 (C.P. 1970); City of Cleveland v. Street Employees Div. 268,
30 Ohio Op. 395 (C.P. 1945).
[Vol. 24:672
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at least where civil service employees are involved, that labor unions
and collective bargaining have no role to play.39 The court in Hager-
man stated:
The laws of this state, the regulations of the civil service
commissions, state and municipal, and the valid ordinances of
the particular municipality cover fully all questions of wages,
hours of work and conditions of employment affecting civil ser-
vice appointees. 40
The supreme court decision in Hagerman that public employers of
civil service employees do not have the authority to engage in collective
bargaining has not been overruled; several lower courts, however, have
indicated disapproval in dicta. The first case to do so was Foltz v. City
of Dayton4 1 which dealt with the issue of whether an involuntary union
security clause, which was part of a collective bargaining agreement,
could be enforced. Although the court used Hagerman style reasoning
and found the cause invalid because it was an exercise of a police regula-
tion which conflicted with the Ohio Revised Code,42 the decision contained
a statement that civil service employees have a right to bargain collec-
tively. 43 Made without any recognition of opposing decisions in prior
cases and without the use of precedent or discussion of the problems, the
proposition apparently seemed so self-evident to the court that it failed
to provide support. Although this statement was not part of the issue
and consequent holding of the case, it was used by later courts seeking
to find precedent which approved public employer collective bargain-
ing. 44  Although it did not deal with civil service employees, another
case which noted that those employees have a right to bargain collective-
ly with their employer was North Royalton.
4 5
The issue of whether employers of civil service employees can engage
in collective bargaining presents problems which are not involved in other
instances and which have not been adequately dealt with in Ohio case
law. The situation should not be viewed in the terms of Hagerman; col-
lective bargaining as a process is not inherently contrary to the purpose
of civil service laws, but rather should be viewed as a process which cre-
ates a channel for employer and employee to communicate with respect
to conditions of employment. This type of communication is frequently
beneficial in maintaining satisfactory and stable relations between gov-
3' Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 328-29, 71 N.E.2d 245, 254 (1947).
40 Id.
4' 27 Ohio App. 2d 35, 272 N.E.2d 169 (1970).
42 Id. at 42-43, 272 N.E.2d at 173. The court noted a conflict with OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.40 (Page 1968).
43 Id. at 42, 71 N.E.2d at 173.
44 North Royalton Educ. Ass'n v. North Royalton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio App. 2d 209, 325
N.E.2d 901 (1974); Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., No.
4291 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 20, 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 41 Ohio St. 2d 127;
323 N.E.2d 714 (1975).
45 North Royalton Educ. Ass'n v. North Royalton Rd. of Educ., 41 Ohio App. 2d 209, 216,
325 N.E. 2d 901, 906-07 (1974).
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ernment and its employees. 46  Yet the potential for conflict between
collective bargaining agreements and civil service laws must be recog-
nized. The issue would best be resolved by legislative indication of
whether civil service laws or collective bargaining agreements should
have priority; since the legislature has not yet expressed itself on this
matter, several alternatives should be considered. The obvious and logi-
cal fact is that collectively bargained agreements can be written in such
a manner as to anticipate and attempt to avoid any conflicts with civil
service law. 47  If portions of the contract do not avoid that conflict it
would appear that those offending provisions could be deleted and the
remainder of the contract could continue in effect. 48
To some extent Ohio case law has been fashioned by the fact that
early cases dealing with collective bargaining concerned employers of
civil service employees. 49  Hagerman, for example, referred to civil ser-
vice employees and yet has been cited for the general proposition that
it prohibits any public employer from engaging in collective bargain-
ing.5° Recent cases in the area have dealt with non-civil service em-
ployers5' and this may in part account for the confusion and subsequently
emerging trend of allowing public employers to engage in collective
bargaining. The distinction, however, must be clearly drawn and the
authority of the employer of civil service employees to engage in collec-
tive negotiations needs to be carefully rethought. Hagerman no longer
presents realistic guidelines which can be followed.
D. Delegation of Authority
The argument that it is an unlawful delegation of authority for a pub-
lic employer to engage in collective bargaining has been used to void col-
lective agreements, 52 especially those which contain binding arbitration
clauses.53  It has been stated that "the principle is fundamental and of
46 Foltz v. City of Dayton, 27 Ohio App. 2d 35, 272 N.E.2d 169 (1970) (Crawford, J.,
concurring).
47 North Royalton Educ. Ass'n v. North Royalton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio App. 2d 209, 216,
325 N.E.2d 901, 907 (1974).
4s Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of Norwalk, 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482
(1951). See also Seasongood & Barrow, Unionization of Public Employees, 21 U. CIN.
L. REv. 327, 368 (1952).
41 Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 245 (1947); City of Cleve-
land v. Street Employees Div. 268, 30 Ohio Op. 395 (C.P. 1945).
50 Youngstown Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 36 Ohio App. 2d 35, 42, 301 N.E.2d 891,
896 (1973) (concurring opinion).
5l Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323
N.E.2d 714 (1975); Malone v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 33362 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9,
1975); North Royalton Educ. Ass'n v. North Royalton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio App. 2d
209, 325 N.E.2d 901 (1974); Hamilton Bd. of Educ. v. Arthur, 84 L.R.R.M. 2468 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1973); Youngstown Educ. Ass'n v. Youngstown City Bd. of Educ., 36 Ohio
App. 2d 35, 301 N.E.2d 891 (1973).
52 Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 329, 71 N.E.2d 246, 254 (1947); Youngs-
town Educ. Ass'n v. Youngstown City Bd. of Educ., 36 Ohio App. 2d 35, 40, 301 N.E.2d
891, 895 (1973).
-13 Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., No. 4291 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 20, 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975);
Hamilton Bd. of Educ. v. Arthur, 84 L.R.R.M. 2468 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
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universal application that public powers conferred upon a municipal
corporation and its officers and agents can not be surrendered or dele-
gated to others."54  The Hagerman court applied the delegation of au-
thority argument to collective bargaining and stated that if an employer
were to engage in collective bargaining it would then be delegating its
authority under the civil service laws to the union with which it was
bargaining.5 5
When the delegation of authority argument is used to invalidate a
collective bargaining agreement or to declare that a public employer can-
not engage in collective bargaining, it can be rebutted as it was in
Malone v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County.56 The court in
that case stated that engaging in the collective bargaining process should
be construed as an exercise of authority rather than an unlawful delega-
tion of authority. 57 When the public official bargains with a union he
is not transferring all his power to a union but is maintaining his author-
ity as the employer. With the change in the bargaining process from
the relationship of the employer and employee to the relationship of the
employer and his organized employees, the balance of power may become
more equalized but the employer still maintains his authority. Given the
present state of labor relations, the traditional manner of dealing with a
single employee may not be fruitful, whereas collective bargaining
enables the employer to exercise his authority to conclude a master
contract which may be more conducive to stability. This is the implica-
tion of Malone, and it appears to be an acceptable response to the argu-
ment of unlawful delegation of authority.
Although it is suggested that the collective bargaining process does
not necessarily involve delegation of authority, it is conceded that an
agreement so arrived at may result in such a delegation. This was appar-
ently the situation in Youngstown Education Association v. Youngstown
City Board of Education.58 In that case the court concluded that section
9.41 of the Ohio Revised Code provided the necessary legislative sanc-
tion for public employer collective bargaining; 9 yet all three judges
agreed that the board could not delegate its authority to manage the
schools. 0 The case involved a master agreement which was understood
to exist between the Youngstown Education Association (YEA) and the
board of education. Subsequent to the formation of the agreement the
board adopted certain policies pertaining to the management of the
It has been further suggested by a conservative court that a second reason to invali-
date an arbitration provision, in addition to the delegation rationale, is that the arbitra-
tors might be ignorant of the civil service laws. City of Cleveland v. Street Employees
Div. 268, 30 Ohio Op. 395, 410 (C.P. 1945). The speciousness of this argument is ap-
parent.
54 McQUtLtaN, supra note 20, at § 10.39.
5- Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 329, 71 N.E.2d 246, 254 (1947).
51 No. 33362 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 7, 1975).
57 Id. at 10.
5 36 Ohio App. 2d 35, 301 N.E.2d 891 (1973).
59 Id. at 43, 301 N.E.2d at 897 (Lynch, P.J. and Donofrio, J., concurring).
60 Id. at 40, 301 N.E.2d at 895.
19751
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss4/5
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
schools and affecting the relationship of teachers, students, parents, and
the board. The YEA felt that these policies were in breach of the master
agreement which provided for negotiations over all teachers' working condi-
tions, and sought to enjoin the superintendent from enforcing the regu-
lations.61 The decision did not describe exactly what policies were involved
but indicated only the school board had the authority to make those
policies; furthermore, if they were subject to negotiations between the
board and the YEA an illegal delegation of authority would result. Since
all three judges on the court agreed that in this particular circumstance
only' the board had the authority to make policies and since two of three
judges found explicit legislative sanction for collective bargaining, the
opinion further obfuscates the issue of what constitutes an illegal dele-
gation of authority.
The delegation of authority problem is more apparent in contracts
which contain binding arbitration clauses because in such contracts the
employer has agreed to abide by the decision of a third party. Contracts
arrived at through a collective bargaining process are likely to have such
arbitration provisions in order to settle a controversy over the definition
of a disputed contract term or to be employed as the final stage in a
grievance procedure.
In collective bargaining cases no contract containing an arbitration
provision was validated until 1974;62 up to that time arbitration pro-
visions were invalidated as impermissible delegations of authority.,,
The court in North Royalton Education Association v. North Royalton
Board of Education4 found, however, that the restriction against arbi-
tration was not necessarily adhered to by the courts in cases which did
not involve labor relations. In reaching its decision the court relied on
Goldman v. Board of Education15 which involved the right of a board of
education to enter into a contract for the installation of plumbing which
included an arbitration provision to resolve potential disputes. The
Goldman court found authority for the arbitration clause under sections
2711.01 et seq. of the Revised Code6 6 which set forth the provisions for
arbitration of disputes which the parties have agreed to arbitrate. Both
courts adhered to the philosophy that arbitration serves the purpose of
avoiding long disputes and litigation6 7 and the North Royalton court saw
61 Id. at 38-39, 301 N.E.2d at 894.
62 North Royalton Educ. Ass'n v. North Royalton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio App. 2d 209,
325 N.E.2d 901 (1974), was the first case to validate an arbitration clause within a col-
lective bargaining contract.
'- See cases cited note 53 supra.
64 41 Ohio App. 2d 209, 325 N.E.2d 901 (1974).
15 5 Ohio App. 2d 49, 213 N.E.2d 826 (1965).
66 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01 - .16 (Page Supp. 1974). Until amended in 1955
these provisions covering arbitration explicitly excluded arbitration clauses in collective
contracts between employers and employees with regard to terms and conditions of em-
ployment. This explicit exclusion, however, was omitted when the section was rewrit-
ten in 1955.
' North Royalton Educ. Ass'n v. North Royalton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio App. 2d 209, 214,
325 N.E.2d 901, 905 (1974); Goldman v. Board of Educ., 5 Ohio App. 2d 49, 50, 213
N.E.2d 826, 827 (1965).
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no reason to treat an arbitration provision in an employment contract
any differently than an arbitration provision in another type of contract to
which the board of education is a party. This is an interesting approach
to the problem of validating collective bargaining by a public employer
because in the past the authority of the public employer in labor rela-
tions has not been as broad as their authority in other functions. It is
analytically helpful to use cases outside the labor relations sphere to but-
tress the argument that the public employer has the power to bargain
collectively and to submit some grievances to arbitration.
Despite the fact that arbitration has been allowed outside the labor
relations realm and that the process, like collective bargaining generally,
may avoid long disputes and litigation, there nevertheless remains the
delegation of authority problem. If binding arbitration is a desirable
concomitant to the collective bargaining process, then the legislature or
the courts need to delineate what areas can be submitted to arbitration.
68
E. Binding of Successors
The impermissable binding of successors is the final argument used
against collective bargaining by a public employer. Though none of the
relevant cases have applied this argument to invalidate agreements col-
lectively bargained, it has been used in other jurisdictions.6 9 The court
in North Royalton dealt with this issue in an interesting manner stating
that a public official performs
not for himself or for his successors. His principal is the public
and when he acts for it be can bind it to contracts beyond his
term in the absence of statutory impediments.70
In buttressing this argument, the North Royalton court again found sup-
port outside the labor relations sphere7 1 and suggested that if the problem
of binding successors is crucial, it, like the civil service laws, can be fore-
seen and taken into account in the making of the contract. 72  The North
Royalton decision, which is one of the most complete in the area, has
thus effectively disposed of the problem of binding successors.
68 In the private sector there is a presumption of arbitrability of grievances when there
is a no-strike clause even though there is no express provision in the contract indicat-
ing that the particular grievance is arbitrable. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960). The courts, however, are not so willing to
declare a dispute arbitrable in the public sector. "In large part, this has probably re-
sulted because public employers are seen to retain broader discretion and 'management
rights' to control the employment circumstance than are their private sector counter-
parts." SMITH, supra note 5, at 938.
1 See American Fed'n of State Empl. Dist. 33 v. City of Philadelphia, 83 Pa. D. & C. 537
(C.P. 1952). See generally Dole, State and Local Public Employee Collective Bargain-
ing in the Absence of Explicit Legislative Authorization, 54 IowA L. REV. 539, 548
(1969).
7 41 Ohio App. 2d at 216, 325 N.E.2d at 907 (1974).
7, State ex rel. McGoldrick v. Lewis, 12 Ohio Dec. 46 (1901).
72 41 Ohio App. 2d at 216, 325 N.E.2d at 907 (1974).
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F. Proprietary Functions of Government
In an effort to bring the law into congruence with the reality of public
employer collective bargaining practices it has been suggested that a
distinction be made between the government as an employer when it is
involved in its traditional governing capacity and the government as an
employer when it is involved in a proprietary capacity. 73 Most jurisdic-
tions have held that though this distinction makes a difference in the
tort liability of the governmental agency, it is not applicable to the gov-
ernment's capacity to engage in collective bargaining.
7 4
The Ohio case rejecting this distinction is City of Cleveland v. Street
Employees Div. 268.75 In that case the defendant union argued that be-
cause of the proprietary nature of the transit board's functions the city
had powers commensurate with those of a private corporation. 76  The
court acknowledged that control of the transit system was a proprietary
function with the consequent tort liability and that the city, in connection
with the transit system, could perform in a capacity similar to that of a
private corporation. The court, however, adhered to the traditionally
strict view of municipal powers, i.e., only those powers granted by law. 77
The court's conclusion that, despite the proprietary nature of running
a transit system, the powers of the Cleveland Transit Board are determined
by the laws and interpretations governing public bodies rather than pri-
vate corporations is particularly interesting. The facts revealed that the
City of Cleveland had acquired the transportation system from a private
organization, the Cleveland Railway Company, and that prior to the pur-
chase Division 268 represented the employees of the Cleveland Railway
Company and had obtained collective bargaining agreements with the
company. Thus, the union was seeking to continue representing the
same employees doing the same jobs they had previously performed, the
only variation being the change in ownership of the transit system.
Furthermore, the decision also noted that relations between Division 268
and the Cleveland Railway Company had been peaceful and stable. 7
It is not the contention of this comment that a municipal corporation
engaged in a proprietary function should have all the powers of a private
corporation nor that this argument alone is a sound basis for determin-
ing that a public employer should be able to legally engage in collective
bargaining. Nevertheless, the facts of this case highlight the theoreti-
cally unsound disparity in treatment.
13 See Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Cincinnati Dist. Council No. 51, 17
Ohio Misc. 134, 244 N.E.2d 898 (C.P.), rev'd on other grounds, 22 Ohio App. 2d 39,
257 N.E.2d 410 (1969). See also Christie v. Port of Olympia, 27 Wash. 2d 534, 179
P.2d 294 (1947).
14 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949); Dade County v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees,
157 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963); City of Alcoa v. Electrical Workers Local 760, 203
Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476 (1957).
'- 30 Ohio Op. 395 (C.P. 1945).
76 Id. at 402.
77 Id. at 406.
78 Id. at 402.
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Although it is suggested that the proprietary function of a public
employer alone is not enough of a basis from which to argue that it
should be able to engage in collective bargaining, it is one feature of a
total analysis which indicates that the once narrow view of the authority
of local government in labor relations is no longer meaningful. If col-
lective bargaining in the private sector represents sound public policy de-
signed to balance the power in the employer-employee relationship,
then the same public policy should apply in the public sector when the
government is engaged in proprietary functions.
G. Exclusive Representation
Although the proprietary-governmental distinction is the last of the
basic lines of thinking which are part of the issue of public employer
collective bargaining, one sub-issue, exclusive representation, needs yet
to be discussed. The only Ohio case which deals with exclusive repre-
sentation as part of the issue of public employer collective bargaining
is City of Cleveland v. Street Employees Div. 268. The court in that case
determined that it would be unconstitutional for a public employer to rec-
ognize an exclusive representative for its employees. It referred to the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause and declared that it
"would be tantamount to forcing all employees to become members of
the favored union, and would be unlawful. '" 79
The issue of exclusive bargaining representation is central to the ques-
tion of effective collective bargaining. Section 159(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act8 0 provides for such representation and although
the public employer is exempt from that Act, the policy considerations
are similar to those in the public employment sphere. If, as it is contended,
collective bargaining is the most effective means of creating a stable type
of labor relationship, then exclusive representation, as an essential con-
comitant, must also be allowed. Otherwise, rival employee representa-
tives will create competitive pressures which will cause them to be re-
luctant to reach an agreement until every other representative has ac-
cepted the same terms. 8'
Although these practical guidelines do not entirely answer constitu-
tional questions they do relate to fourteenth amendment considerations
and if exclusive representation does not involve "invidious discrimina-
tion" 2 then it is not a denial of equal protection of the law by the state.
The argument against exclusive representation thus appears weak.
As indicated, there are a number of arguments which can be used to
analyze the validity of collective bargaining for public employers. A
recent Ohio Supreme Court decision is demonstrative of how such an
analysis is avoided.
19 ld. at 407.
8o 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970).
s1 See Dole, supra note 69, at 546.
s2 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348
U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
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II. DAYTON CLASSROOM TEACHERS ASSOCIATION V.
DAYTON BOARD OF EDUCATION83
Dayton Classroom Teachers Association involved a factual situation
similar to several of the cases previously discussed. Since 1967, the
board of education and the superintendent of Dayton Schools had en-
gaged in collective negotiations and had published their pacts as master
agreements which contained provisions regarding salaries, payroll deduc-
tions, teaching environment, and other conditions. They also included a
four-step procedure for the settling of grievances including a provision
for binding grievance arbitration. Subsequently, the teachers' union
filed working condition grievances and the board took the position that
they were not proper grievances for arbitration, The issues of the case
were whether a board of education may validly enter into a collective
bargaining agreement and whether a binding arbitration clause in such an
agreement is enforceable.8 4
The Ohio Supreme Court began with the proposition from Schwing
v. McClure 5 that the contractual powers of a board of education are
limited by statutory authority, i.e., the board of education has only those
powers expressly given or necessarily implied from its express powers.8 6
The court then approved the policy that relations between public em-
ployers and their employees must be limited by legislative policies and
goals.8 7 Following this statement of policy the court considered the stat-
utory authority of a board of education. It cited the sections of the code
granting a board of education the authority to manage and control the
schools, the authority to contract, and more specifically the authority to
enter into written contracts for the employment of teachers.8 8 Con-
sidering these provisions the court concluded that the board of education
had been "granted broad discretionary powers in its dual role of manager
of schools and employer of teachers."8 9 Here the court used a more
practical analysis in reaching its conclusion that the school board had
implied authority to engage in collective bargaining.
In its consideration of the unlawful delegation of authority argument
the court stated that agreements by boards of education are usually in-
validated upon an unlawful delegation basis only when a school board has
sought to absolve itself from fulfilling its responsibilities under the agree-
ment. The court continued that when a school board benefits from an
agreement, such an agreement is normally upheld by the courts.90
The only case which the court referred to on this issue was State ex rel.
Ohio High School Athletic Association v. Judges of the Court of Common
83 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975).
14 Id. at 130, 323 N.E.2d at 716.
85 120 Ohio St. 335, 166 N.E. 230 (1929).
86 Hamilton Bd. of Educ. v. Arthur, 84 L.R.R.M. 2468 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
87 41 Ohio St. 2d at 131, 323 N.E.2d at 717.
88 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.08, .17, .33, .47 (Page 1972).
89 41 Ohio St. 2d at 131, 323 N.E.2d at 717.
90 Id. at 131-32, 323 N.E.2d at 717.
[Vol. 24:672
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Pleas.91 Failing to distinguish the cases in principle, the court in Athletic
Association upheld an agreement that authorized a public school to join
a private association in which the school was bound by the by-laws of
the association. 92 This case, then, clearly supports the position that dele-
gation of authority by school boards has not always been held invalid.
Additionally, it can once again be seen that cases outside the field of
labor relations can be useful in determining labor relations questions.
The court proceeded to deal with the arbitration issue but again it
cited no Ohio labor cases though it did refer to a Wisconsin case 93 for
the proposition that arbitration of disputes may contribute to harmonious
relations.9
This was the sum total of the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in
Dayton Classroom Teachers Association. Although the decision seems
to bring Ohio law into congruence with modern trends by permitting
public employers to bargain collectively, the decision was incomplete.
The court made no reference to a distinction between a school board and
any other kind of public employer; thus the holding narrowly applies
only to school boards and would appear to have no effect on the Hager-
man decision dealing with civil service employees. The court also failed
to establish any guidelines regarding what matters can be included in a
bargaining agreement or a binding arbitration clause and did not consider
the position that some matters constitute such basic policy that they can-
not be subjected to bargaining or arbitration. The decision would have
been more helpful if it had presented an in-depth analysis of the issues
as did the court in North Royalton. It does appear, however, that school
boards can now legally enter collective bargaining agreements which will
be enforced by the courts and that those agreements can include provi-
sions for arbitration of grievances.
III. CONCLUSION
It is suggested that some form of a complete in-depth analysis and a
set of guidelines are needed to cope with the problems of public employ-
ers and collective bargaining. It would be desirable if Judge Corrigan's
pleas in his concurring opinion in Malone were heeded. He said that
statements of policy will remain merely pallatives until more
meaningful steps are taken by organized labor and an informed
public to formalize by legislation, and not by strained judicial
interpretation, the rights of the public employees not protected
by civil service laws.95
11 173 Ohio St. 239, 181 N.E.2d 261 (1962).
92 Id. at 241, 181 N.E.2d at 262.
9 Local 1226 v. Rhinelander, 35 Wisc. 2d 209, 151 N.W.2d 30 (1967).
9 Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 133,
323 N.E.2d 714, 718 (1975).
s Malone v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 33362, at 10 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1975)
(Corrigan, J., concurring). Contra, Green, Concerted Public Employee Activity in the
Absence of State Statutory Authorization: II, 2 J. OF LAW & ED. 419, 429-30 (1973), in
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To ensure comprehensiveness, such legislation should also specify the right
of civil service employees to engage in collective bargaining.
Short of broad legislation, any in-depth analysis by the courts must
begin with a recognition of the traditional problems involved, i.e., the
narrowly construed powers of local government, the possible conflict of
a collective bargaining agreement with merit legislation, the delegation
of authority problem, and the binding of successors problem. These ar-
guments need to be answered.
The issue must finally be viewed from the point of public policy.
Public employers are engaging in collective bargaining with their em-
ployees whether the ultimate agreement has legal effect or not. Legali-
zation of the bargaining process may be productive of a more stable labor
relationship. Recent Ohio case law has failed to lend that much needed
clarity and stability.
KAREN BERNs NEWBORN
which it is argued that despite the absence of legislation, collective bargaining is working
and that adoption of legislation would destroy the flexibility now enjoyed by public em-
ployers and public employees.
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